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Abstract
This paper will examine judicial review of the arbitration process from the viewpoint of the
arbitrator, who is professionally interested in careful and fair procedures leading to an award that
will not be overturned by the courts. The principle area of study will be the maritime arbitrations
to which the Federal Arbitration Act (the statute) applies to.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper will examine judicial review of the arbitration
process from the viewpoint of the arbitrator who is professionally
interested in careful and fair procedures leading to an award which
will not be overturned by the courts. To understand that view-
point, it is important to note that the viewpoints of others, parties
to the arbitration and counsel, impact greatly on the process and
the role of the arbitrators. As a practitioner, for example, my
principal interest was often the search for new and unusual grounds
to overturn awards in which the arbitrators had made the grievous
error of deciding against my client. We should face up to the sober
truth that losing parties will always explore and exploit opportuni-
ties to overturn arbitral awards. The principal area of study will be
those maritime arbitrations to which the Federal Arbitration Act
(the statute) applies.'
Despite the tendency of American courts and lawyers to be
overly technical as a general rule, when it comes to arbitration our
courts will not review the procedures, fact findings or statements of
the law by arbitrators. They will, however, examine the conduct of
arbitrators very closely, if challenged, to see that the arbitration
was fair and appeared to be fair. It is this aspect of American
arbitrations that scholars of comparative law find unique. Our
courts simply will not interfere with the conduct of the arbitration,
the fact finding, the legal rationale or the issuance of the award
unless there is a defect which goes to the very heart of the American
legal system, the appearance of fairness.
*Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; 1982 Distinguished Visiting Professor, United
States Merchant Marine Academy; A.B. 1954, Harvard College; J.D. 1957, Boston Univer-
sity; L.L.M. 1963, Columbia University. Faculty Advisor to the Fordham International Law
Journal. This paper was delivered during the Fifth International Congress of Maritime
Arbitrators held in New York, October 22, 1981.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1976).
The legislation was enacted initially in 1925. Act of February 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-
401, 43 Stat. 883. Its constitutionality was unsuccessfully challenged but approved by the
Supreme Court in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
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Unlike judgments of lower courts, the arbitration award can-
not be reversed by appellate courts because of legal errors in the
written award but only because of the misconduct of the arbitra-
tors, described by the Federal Arbitration Act as, "Evident partial-
ity or corruption in the arbitrators" or when the award was pro-
cured by, "corruption fraud or undue means" or arbitrator
misconduct respecting a fair hearing or arbitrator misbehavior
which has prejudiced the rights of a party or nullified their
award.2  There is a very strong presumption in favor of upholding
the final and definite award of arbitrators. The consequence of this
presumption is that the winning party does not have the burden of
establishing the perfect qualities of the award. Rather, the burden
is on the losing party to bring the award within the grounds for
vacating the award established by the statute.
The theory of American arbitration is that the parties to an
arbitral agreement knowingly take the risks of error of fact or law
committed by the arbitrators and that this is a worthy "trade-off"
in order to obtain speedy decisions by experts in the field whose
practical experience and worldly reasoning will be accepted as
correct by other experts.
Arbitration is created by contract and depends upon the free
choice of the parties for the resolution of their disputes by experts
rather than the submission to national judicial resolution. This free
choice can never be totally free of involvement with national courts
2. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976).
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made had not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
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if payment of an award must be exacted from the losing party. 3
This paper will examine the extent to which courts in this country
intervene in the process of arbitration. It will not address the prob-
lems associated with the actual collection of money from the losing
party.
It has been said in some decisions that the courts lack the
power to interfere with the arbitration until the award has been
3. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38. Fifty nations are parties thereto. It was acceded to by the United States on
September 30, 1970, to be in force as of December 29, 1970 and incorporated into domestic
law in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976). Article V lists a number of reasons for refusing to give
recognition and enforcement to such awards, as follows:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to Article II were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country
where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present this case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country.
See also European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21, 1961,
arts. V, IX, 484 U.N.T.S. 364, 370-72, 374-76; Convention for the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, arts. I-III, 92 L.N.T.S. 302, 305-06.
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made.4  This statement may be too broad where the essential fair-
ness of the arbitration has been compromised at the outset. In those
situations courts can prevent the arbitrators from a nullity-the
unenforceable award-by the use of the court's inherent powers to
protect the arbitration process, for example, by disqualifying an
arbitrator before the making of an award.5
An argument frequently made by a party not wishing to arbi-
trate is that he will not appoint an arbitrator since there is no
dispute.6 This argument is uniformly rejected by the courts as an
attempt to determine in advance what only the arbitrators are to
consider. The party resisting arbitration can succeed with the "no
dispute" argument only where there is no underlying contract or
charter party at all between the parties. 7
Alternatively, courts rely on the principle that there is nothing
for courts to consider until an arbitration award has been presented
for confirmation.8
The broad scope of the requirement to arbitrate disputes can
be illustrated by the problem of the time bar, whether in the form
of the statutory one year time bar of the Carriage of the Goods by
4. In re Dover S.S. Co., 143 F. Supp. 738, 740-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also In re
Michaels, 624 F.2d 411, 1980 A.M.C. 1901 (2d Cir. 1980); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v.
Steamship Grand Commonwealth, 1978 A.M.C. 975 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (where after 40
hearings, a party is requesting court interference because "these proceedings have deterio-
rated to the point where meaningful and productive arbitration cannot be conducted." Id. at
976. Motion denied so as not to intervene with arbitrators in "midstream" and countenance a
"pandora's box" of delaying tactics).
5. See In re Astoria Medical Group, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401
(1962). In this case the court discussed its "inherent power to disqualify an arbitrator before
the making of an award." 11 N.Y.2d at 132.
6. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(where the Court reserved all matters of substance for the arbitrators while limiting the
Court's preliminary examination to the existence of an agreement to arbitrate on the question
of whether the stay of proceedings was to be granted).
7. McAllister Bros. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a
dispute must be arbitrated in accordance with the contract even though one of the parties
claims that the contract was abandoned). See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd.,
457 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1972) (where the court said that any doubts as to the scope of an
agreement submitting a dispute to arbitration should be resolved in favor of coverage). Note,
however, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) to the effect that a summary trial of the issue must be held if the
making of the arbitration agreement be in issue. See Interbras Cayman Co. v. Orient Victory
Shipping Co., 663 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1981).
8. In re Michaels, 624 F.2d 411, 1980 A.M.C. 1901 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Sea Act 9 or the doctrine of laches.' 0 Despite assertions that exceed-
ing the time bar means that there is no dispute to arbitrate, the
view of the courts is that these questions are solely for determina-
tion by the arbitrators and not for preliminary determination by
the courts.I
The true remedy where no contract exists is to seek a protective
order of the courts staying the arbitration.12
I. APPOINTMENT OF THE ARBITRAL BODY: PROBLEM OF
OWNER ARBITRATORS AND CHARTERER ARBITRATORS
If the two parties to a dispute really have free choice of the
arbitrators to be appointed by them, there should be no reason to
deny appointment as arbitrator to someone inordinately sympa-
thetic, such as an officer or employee of one of the parties. This
9. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976). See Republic of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d
377 (2d Cir. 1972).
10. In this doctrine the passage of time alone does not bar claims. The passage of time
must be accompanied by actual prejudice to the defendant to result in the bar of the action.
The Supreme Court has said, "The test of laches is prejudice to the other party." Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Co., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963).
11. In re Trafalgar Shipping Co., 401 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Hanskar
Shipping Co. v. Iron Ore Co. of Can., 1980 A.M.C. 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976) (stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitra-
tion).
While it was the intent of the specific language to stay court proceedings until arbitra-
tion has been concluded, the statutory language is that, "upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration" the court shall stay the trial of
the action. Id. Accordingly, where the court determines that the issue is not referable to
arbitration, then under normal equity practice, upon a showing of irreparable harm, the
court can protect its jurisdiction in the trial of the action by an order to stay arbitration.
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), an action brought by a customer against a
securities brokerage firm to recover damages for alleged misrepresentation in the sale of
securities, the Supreme Court held the agreement for arbitrating future controversies be-
tween the parties to be void under section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, despite the
provision of the Arbitration Act. Under this view, the motion to compel arbitration should
have been denied and a motion to stay arbitration should have been granted.
In Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), an action
brought by a former employee against his former employer concerning a profit sharing plan,
the Supreme Court found that California's Wage Earners' Relief Statutes were not preempted
by provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whereby an arbitration of the dispute
would have been required.
Recently, in Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
petitions to stay arbitration and to compel arbitration were before the court. Petitions to
compel were granted. See also In re J.E. Hurley Lumber Co., 148 F. Supp. 144, 1957
A.M.C. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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suggestion makes us uneasy because we have an innate feeling that
no one should be judge of his own claim.
Our repugnance at the idea of a party arbitrating his own
dispute is strengthened by Mr. Justice Black's often-cited dicta in
the famous Commonwealth Coatings case. 13  This case indicates
that arbitrators should be even more impartial than judges. Justice
Black's framing of the question was significant: "whether elemen-
tary requirements of impartiality taken for granted in every judicial
proceeding are suspended when the parties agree to resolve a dis-
pute through arbitration."' 4  His negative conclusion could be an-
ticipated and summarized in his statement, "[Section 10] show(s) a
desire of Congress to provide not merely for any arbitration but for
an impartial one."' 5  Justice Black wrote on the appearance of
bias:
It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the
business world, since they are not expected to get all their in-
come from their work deciding cases, but we should, if any-
thing, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of
arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free
rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to
appellate review ... any tribunal permitted by law to try cases
and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid
even the appearance of bias."6
13. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149
(1968). In this case a subcontractor sued the sureties of the prime contractor to recover
payments owing. An arbitration, pursuant to the contract whereby a three man board was
appointed, had rendered an award in favor of the prime contractor. The subcontractor
sought to vacate the award on the ground of evident partiality of the third arbitrator who
had had occasional business dealings with the prime contractor, some of which involved the
matter in dispute, none of which was revealed before the award. The arbitral award was
vacated. The decision of the court was four justices for vacation of the award (Black writing
the opinion), three justices opposed (Fortas writing the opinion), and two justices concurring
with the Black opinion but with an opinion by Justice White who restated the holding as
follows: "where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than
trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed." Id. at 151-52 (White, J., concur-
ring).
Justice White went on to note that if arbitrators err on the side of disclosure, as they
should, it will not be difficult for courts to identify those undisclosed relationships which are
too insubstantial to warrant vacating an award. Id. at 152 (White, J., concurring). His
attitude is best expressed in the sentence: "I see no reason automatically to disqualify the best
informed and most capable potential arbitrators." Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 145.
15. Id. at 147.
16. Id. at 148-50.
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This language may have misled courts into the belief that the
Supreme Court requires a standard beyond actual "partisanship" at
the level of "not even an appearance of partisanship," an unrealistic
standard for industry professionals.
In the maritime industry some arbitrators work for owners
while others work for charterers and frequently arbitrators can be
found who deal with both sides. As the maritime industry's prob-
lems become more complex because of financings of vessels and tax
and labor law considerations, it is not unusual to find people whom
we normally think of as "owners" acting as charterers and vice
versa.
The innate sense of fairness previously mentioned should lead
us to say that having agreed that disputes will be arbitrated, the
parties do not have absolute free choice with respect to the person-
nel or the manner in which the arbitration is conducted. Thus,
although other legal systems may permit the two-arbitrator award
where the arbitration clause provides for a three-person arbitration,
in this country the third arbitrator must be appointed.17
The American legal system expects that the parties will ap-
point people in whose professional expertise they have confidence.
Thus, we customarily have party-appointed arbitrators whose busi-
ness connections may be wholly non-neutral, in the sense that they
are always identified with the exact same economic interests as the
party appointing them. The New York Court of Appeals has said
that even such a party-appointed arbitrator must act "in a quasi-
judicial capacity and should possess the judicial qualifications of
fairness to both parties so that he may render a faithful, honest and
disinterested opinion." 8
A later opinion has tolerated "partisanship" of party-appointed
arbitrators as long as the arbitrator is not "deaf to the testimony or
blind to the evidence presented." 9 In that case a party appointed
17. Western Can. S.S. Co. v. Compania de Navegacion San Leonardo Anglo Can.
Shipping Co., 105 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Here, noting the English practice, the two
party arbitrators, believing their decision would be unanimous, said that the third arbitrator
need not be appointed; vacation of the award was granted.
18. In re American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 398, 405, 148 N.E. 562, 564 (1925).
19. In re Astoria Medical Group, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 137, 182 N.E.2d 85, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401
(1962). See also Note, Members of Board of Directors Designated by Corporation as Partisan
Arbitrator Not Subject to Disqualification on Ground of Presumptive Bias, 63 COLUM. L.
REv. 374 (1963).
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a member of its board of directors as arbitrator, but since the
parties had agreed to tripartite arbitration, they thereby agreed to
partisan appointees by each other, and most importantly, "neither
may object to the other's designation of someone associated with his
interest or related to him."12 0
This New York decision is also reflected in federal cases under
the Arbitration Act. Thus, it has been held that the charter lan-
guage providing for a three man arbitration could permit the nam-
ing of two "interested" person arbitrators (for owner: his managing
agent; for charterer: the chartering broker), and there would be no
ground for vacation of the award.2' The key to our tolerance for
partisan arbitrators is the full knowledge and agreement of the
parties with the further requirement that the "neutral" arbitrator
appointed by the two partisan arbitrators becomes in effect the sole
arbitrator, who clearly cannot be partisan in any way.
The law respecting disqualifications of arbitrators from mari-
time arbitrations can now give rise to much waste and inefficiency
when awards are vacated because of disqualified arbitrators. The
courts have said that the mere designation of an arbitrator does not
create a situation for interference by the court. 22 Under this view,
it is necessary to await the award before the court can interfere.
At the first hearing the arbitrators must be judges of their own
impartiality so that a party who contests the impartiality of the
third party must put his case against that arbitrator on the record of
the hearing, an obviously risky proposition if the challenge is de-
nied. Note that in arbitrations administered by the American Arbi-
tration Association (A.A.A.) the challenges are decided by the
20. 11 N.Y.2d 128, 138 (1962) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
21. Petrol Corp. v. Groupement D'Achat des Carburants, 84 F. Supp. 446, 1949
A.M.C. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Caution must be exercised with this case, however, because the
party appointed arbitrators acted as advocates and the third arbitrator was the umpire. No
objection was raised by the losing party until after the award. See also Stef Shipping Corp. v.
Norris Grain Co., 209 F. Supp. 249, 1963 A.M.C. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In this case the
court said, "in a tripartite arrangement, where each party to a dispute is given the right to
select an arbitrator and the third member is selected by them or by a disinterested party, the
arbitrator selected by the disputants cannot be expected to play a wholly impartial part. They
are partisans once removed from the actual controversy." 209 F. Supp. at 253, 1963 A.M.C.
at 1044 (emphasis added).
22. In re Dover S.S. Co., 143 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Albatross S.S. Co. v.
Manning Bros., 95 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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A.A.A. administrators, thereby removing the arbitrators from the
position of judging their own actions.23
If maritime arbitration is to remain flexible so that parties to a
dispute can continue to enjoy the expertise of fellow members of the
maritime profession, then we must be prepared to risk the ineffi-
ciency of the existing system described below. To overcome these
problems, the only effective solution would be to submit the dis-
putes to the administration of formal arbitral authorities such as the
A.A.A. or the Society of Maritime Arbitrators (S.M.A.).
In recent years it has been recognized that it is impossible to
have arbitration by shipping industry experts totally insulated from
any previous contacts with the parties. This problem is even more
extreme in the search for the arbitrator selected "chairman. ' 24
The problems have recently been discussed in an important Second
Circuit decision and several lower court opinions.25
The initial proposition to be recognized is that the third arbi-
trator can not have any direct and substantial financial relationship
with a party nor any professional or attorney-client relationship
with a party.26
The recent case of The Ross Isle27 shows that after more than
sixty years of experience with arbitration statutes it is not yet clear
whether an arbitrator is a juror, who must be kept isolated from a
dispute until the hearing, or a judge, whose professional training
23. See AM. Aim. ASS'N R. § 18. Section 9 of the Rules of the Society of Maritime
Arbitrators requires that not later than the commencement of the first hearing, an Arbitrator
must disclose "any circumstance tending to raise a presumption of the bias or which he
believes might disqualify him as an impartial Arbitrator, including close personal ties or
business relations." Thereafter the parties shall declare if they are willing to proceed, and if
either party declines to waive a presumptive disqualification "the vacancy thus created shall
be filled in accordance with the applicable provisions of these Rules" (i.e. § 14).
24. The disqualifying "evident partiality," however, applies to every member of the
panel and not just the "chairman." Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. v. M/T Akti, 438 F.
Supp. 153 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
25. International Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1981) (The Ross
Isle); In re Sanko S.S. Co., 495 F.2d 1260, 1973 A.M.C. 2088 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Cook
Indus., 449 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1971); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1967); In re Transmarine Seaways Corp., 480 F. Supp. 352, 1979 A.M.C. 1496
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
26. See In re Sanko S.S. Co., 495 F.2d 1260, 1973 A.M.C. 2088 (2d Cir. 1973). It was
claimed that the third arbitrator had an undisclosed financial relationship with a party. The
appellate court returned the record to the trial court for a factual hearing.
27. 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1981).
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and oath of office permits the fact that he may have acquired
information about a dispute outside the hearing to be disregarded.
In The Ross Isle case, a unanimous arbitration award had been
vacated by the district court because of the failure of the panel
chairman, appointed by the two party-designated arbitrators, to
disqualify himself during the arbitration. 28  That vacation was
reversed by the court of appeals .29
The arbitration hearing began with disclosures in accordance
with the S.M.A. rules, during which the panel chairman disclosed
that counsel for the owners was, "handling one P & I case of
ours." 30 Nevertheless, counsel for charterers accepted the panel.
A second hearing was held, at which the master and pilot
testified before the panel chairman and the charterer-appointed
arbitrator. Due to illness, the owner-appointed arbitrator did not
read the transcript until later.
Before the third hearing, however, an incident occurred in-
volving a vessel managed by the firm of which the panel chairman
was a vice president. The panel chairman was personally involved
in negotiations with charterers. The charterers were represented by
another attorney in the same law firm which was representing
charterers in the subject arbitration. Counsel for owners repre-
sented the panel chairman's firm. As a result of unsuccessful negoti-
ations, arbitration was demanded in the new incident, and it ap-
peared that the panel chairman might be called as a witness in the
new arbitration dispute and be subject to cross examination by
charterers. At that point counsel for charterers demanded that the
panel chairman withdraw because of a presumption of bias result-
ing from the "adversary-type" roles which might be assumed in the
new arbitration. 3'
The panel chairman declined to remove himself suggesting
that counsel for charterers withdraw from the second arbitra-
tion. 32 The panel chairman was prepared to proceed with the first
arbitration on condition that a lawyer associated with the firm
28. In re International Produce, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
29. The Ross Isle, 638 F.2d at 552.
30. 504 F. Supp. at 737.
31. Id. at 738.
32. Id. This suggestion might properly be regarded as a declaration of war. Arbitrators
must surely resist the temptation to write letters to counsel or parties in a proceeding before
them unless merely to confirm a hearing date.
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representing owners who had worked on both cases be withdrawn
from the new dispute, which was done. A final hearing in the
subject arbitration was held and a unanimous award rendered. The
panel chairman was called as a witness in the new dispute and was
subjected to a "vigorous cross-examination" by an attorney from the
firm representing the charterers in the subject arbitration. 33
The district court's decision to vacate the award was based on
the appearance of bias. The court noted that disclosure alone does
not discharge the arbitrator's responsibility to avoid the appearance
of partiality in view of the fact that it is "[easy and costless] to
replace an arbitrator when proper disclosure is made and exception
taken at the outset of arbitration. ' 34 In the district court's view
there was not only a potential bias in favor of the owner but also a
potential bias against the charterers which was aggravated by the
cross examination because "[t]he arbitrator's exposure to the facts
and issues in arbitration . . . is through the attorneys and not
through the parties" and, "his rapport and ability to communicate
with the attorneys may well have a substantial impact on the course
of a proceeding. ' 35  Thus, the "unusual conjunction of contacts
...with both law firms participating in the arbitration before him
brings this within that special class of cases requiring vacation. ' '36
The district judge shared the concerns of earlier decisions over
the small size of the maritime community and the inevitability that
arbitrators will be drawn from active business practice so that a
certain measure of interrelationship between arbitrators and parties
or their counsel may exist or develop. He concluded, however, that
the extent and nature of the interrelationships in this case were not
susceptible to the normally effective practice of disclosure and
waiver, and vacated the award.
The lower court decision, vacating a unanimous award,
caused consternation among New York maritime arbitrators be-
cause of the supposed impossibility of obtaining learned and experi-
enced arbitrators who had no speculative conflicts of interest and
had never in the past become involved commercially with the
parties in a dispute. It was feared that The Ross Isle case repre-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 739 n.2 (referring to the opinion of Judge Frankel in Miserocchi v. Peavey
Int'l Inc., No. 78 Civ. 1571 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1978)).
35. Id. at 739.
36. Id. at 740.
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sented an imaginary and unnecessary standard of non-involvement
which might harm the development of maritime arbitration in
America.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has now reversed
the decision on the basis that the standard of "appearance of bias"
used to disqualify the arbitrator in the lower court was a higher
standard than Congress had developed in section 10 of the Statute,
which required the vacation of an arbitration award where there
had been evident partiality or corruption. 37
Reviewing the facts, the appellate court considered that the
third arbitrator came to stand in the position of a non-party witness
in a non-related arbitration between parties who were represented
by the same law firms appearing before him in the challenged
arbitration. The court noted both that the other arbitrators had
strongly discouraged the resignation of the challenged arbitrator
and that even the challenging attorney had expressed confidence
that the challenged arbitrator could continue to act judiciously and
objectively without partiality or bias. Thus the court concluded
that there was no substantial basis for ,finding an appearance of
bias; a fortiori, there was no evident partiality. 38
In a 1979 challenge to an arbitration award Judge Haight of
the Southern District of New York had dealt with the question of
the appearance of bias in an allegation that an arbitrator was
disqualified because his company had previously represented an-
other company in a claim wholly unrelated to the subject arbitra-
tion. 3  The earlier unrelated claim had also involved allegations of
arbitrator bias. 40
Judge Haight reached his conclusions by way of the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
37. The Ross Isle, 638 F.2d at 551.
38. Id. at 552.
39. In re Transmarine Seaways Corp., 480 F. Supp. 352, 1979 A.M.C. 1496 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
40. In re Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d 691, 1978 A.M.C. 2108 (2d Cir.
1978). There, after the award, a party sought to vacate on grounds of bias of arbitrator,
unknown to the party before arbitration began. The District Judge refused to permit discov-
ery examination of the arbitrators, holding that only judicially supervised questioning of
arbitration could take place, and then only on condition of the previous presentation of clear
evidence of impropriety. No such clear evidence of impropriety was found where the moving
party did not allege a direct financial stake in the outcome on the part of an executive of the
firm operating the vessel (which was the subject of arbitration) who was a "close personal
friend" of the challenged arbitrator. The allegation of close personal friendship was doubted
in that it was based on service together on 19 arbitration panels. Id. at 701.
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eign Arbitral Awards (article V of the Convention, incorporated in
section 207 of the statute),4 1 whereby enforcement can be denied
where it would be contrary to public policy as set forth by the
Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings.4 2 Judge Haight con-
cluded that the challenged arbitrator had no financial interest in
the party (owner) and saw the charterer's complaint as solely that
of the arbitrator's company (of which he was the President) repre-
senting another company that had previously asserted an unrelated
claim against the charterer. 43 The charterer claimed that this
relationship was giving "the appearance of bias," but the court
determined there was no authority in the cases for so subjective a
standard, noting that "[b]lemishes, like beauty, lie in the eyes of the
beholder." 44 Accordingly, since there was no direct financial rela-
tionship and no challenge to personal integrity, the allegation of
appearance of bias must be rejected.
Surely businessmen (and lawyers) have too much of their own
work to do to waste their time in arbitration proceedings where
they have been challenged for bias. There can be no financial
attraction in remaining on such a panel for the arbitrator may not
live long enough to collect a fee in such a case.
II. DISCLOSURES
Since free choice of the parties is the essence of the arbitral
process, our courts will not protect the party who knowingly con-
sents to the appointment of an arbitrator or panel chairman who
may be partisan. In this light, full disclosure by the arbitrators of
their relevant past histories, business connections and social ac-
quaintances becomes the most important part of the first meeting of
the arbitration. In order to protect the position of the parties with
respect to items of which it could be chargeable with knowledge,
parties must put questions to the arbitrators to elicit responses on
the record and the arbitrator must himself insure that his responses
are part of the record. 45
41. See supra note 3.
42. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. 480 F. Supp. at 357-58.
44. Id. at 358.
45. In re Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698, 1957 A.M.C. 1294
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957).
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The outer limits of the knowledgable consent doctrine may be
the case of In re San Nicolas S.A., 48 in which the late Wharton
Poor, a recognized authority on charter disputes, had been ap-
pointed sole arbitrator in a charter party dispute in which his firm
was representing the shipowner. When the award was given in
favor of the owner, the charterers sought to overturn the award.
The court refused to do this in view of the fact that the charterer
had full knowledge of Mr. Poor's status when they consented to his
appointment. The dicta in the opinion, however, is hardly a letter
of recommendation and should be viewed as a warning to the bar
not to repeat it.47
An important non-maritime arbitration holding now justifies
the removal of an arbitrator who was a partner in the law firm
representing one of the parties. 48
The losing party in an arbitration will not be permitted to raise
objections for the first time to the arbitration panel after the award
has been rendered. 49  Absolute propriety is thus not required of the
arbitrators if counsel for the parties passes up the opportunity to
challenge their qualifications.50 Where the record shows the arbi-
trator possessed potentially prejudicial information, the court may
not ignore this and conclude an absence of actual bias.51 By men-
tioning the existence of business dealings between an arbitrator and
a party, the entire extent of such relations must be fully disclosed,
otherwise the record creates or leaves an impression of bias requir-
ing vacation.5 2 Thus, the fact that two arbitrators are shareholders
46. 21 A.D.2d 43, 248 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1964).
47. The lawyer chosen as arbitrator should have been more sensitive to the fact that
being an arbitrator in a matter in which his firm represented one of the litigants
would be regarded by many as unseemly. While there was probably no breach
of ethics or propriety in any professional sense, the lack of sensitivity to the
consequences of such an unlikely selection is regrettable. There are undoubt-
edly unusual situations where one may be quite justified in assuming such a
risky quasi-judicial role, reasonably expecting to avoid any accusation of bias.
But this commercial or maritime arbitration was hardly one in which such a
happy outcome was to be reasonably expected.
21 A.D.2d at 45.
48. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972). But see
Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. M/S Ogeka, 147 F. Supp. 167 (W.D. Wash. 1956) (award not
vacated where third arbitrator had formerly been member of law firm representing a party).
49. See In re Cook Indus. Inc., 449 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Garfield & Co., 432
F.2d 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1970).
50. Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v. Anaconda Co., 418 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1976).
51. See In re Sanko S.S. Co., 495 F.2d 1260, 1973 A.M.C. 2088 (2d Cir. 1973).
52. Id.
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of the charterer gives rise to a presumption of bias requiring expla-
nation .5
The information elicited from arbitrators, truthfully or un-
truthfully, at the outset is of very great importance because of the
principle that arbitrators' post-award testimony may not normally
be used to establish fraud or misconduct in the making of an
award.5 4 The Fukaya case involved a unanimous award, signed by
the three arbitrators, which the unsuccessful party sought to over-
turn by deposing the arbitrators to inquire into their motives to
determine the existence of prejudice. The court ruled that in view
of the fact that there was no dissenting arbitrator and the court
possessed the transcript of the proceedings together with the written
award, there was no basis for deposing the arbitrators since it was
obvious that the arbitrators had effected in the award the result
which they had intended. The court, however, noted that it might
permit deposing the arbitrators to prove an essential mistake, as a
result of which it could be argued that the award operated in a way
not intended by the arbitrators.
Obviously, after the award, counsel for the parties is no longer
concerned with antagonizing the arbitrators. Such is not the case at
the Disclosures in the Arbitration Hearing where rigorous cross-
examination of the third arbitrator can occur. Too rigorous an
examination, however, might result in destroying counsel's hopes of
obtaining a favorable award. The suggestion that the voir dire
examination, practiced in state courts, is appropriate in arbitration
ignores the relative impact of a cross-examination. In a rigorous
courtroom cross-examination an attorney may offend only one of
twelve or six jurors, who could still be persuaded by other jurors.
The same vigorous cross-examination in an arbitration, where par-
tisanship of another arbitrator already exists, may be fatal, espe-
cially where the arbitrators decide on their own qualifications. The
danger for the valid award, whether unanimous or split decision,
occurs when the record itself contains unrefuted allegations of par-
53. Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. v. M/T Akti, 438 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
Here one party was a subsidiary of Exxon in which two of the arbitrators held, respectively,
50 shares and 41 shares out of 226,000,000 shares outstanding; these interests were considered
by the court to be a trivial rather than a substantial interest and therefore not disqualifying.
Id. at 160.
54. Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278, 1971 A.M.C. 905
(E.D. La. 1971).
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tisanship on the part of the third arbitrator.5 5 Thus, in Sanko, the
appellate court vacated a unanimous award and sent the case back
for an evidentiary hearing on the business relationships between the
third arbitrator and the charterer on the ground that there had not
been full disclosure.
Prudence dictates that disclosures now begin with a recitation
not only of the full details about the arbitrators' relations with the
exact parties to the dispute but also the parent or subsidiary status
of such parties and the financial interests involved therein, to be
followed by arbitrators' disclosures with respect to the present dis-
pute, past dealings with the parties and prior business and social
relationships between and among the arbitrators and the attorneys
for the parties. Upon conclusion of the "total hang-out" disclosure,
the Chairman of the Panel should ascertain for the record that, in
light of the disclosures, the Panel is satisfactory to each of the
parties. Indeed, regardless of the fact that busy or expensive wit-
nesses may be kept waiting, the Chairman should not proceed
while issues concerning challenge to a panel member remained
unresolved.
III. CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
With regard to the conduct of the arbitration proceeding,
there is statutory language which clearly controls the actions of the
arbitrators on the side of extreme caution, despite the natural ten-
dency of busy commercial men to seek quick and efficient modes of
proceeding. The most dangerous words in an arbitration hearing
are those which suggest that the parties save time or short cut
cumbersome requirements. Such approaches never work. The lan-
guage involved is misconduct and misbehavior which leads to vaca-
tion of the award; the examples given are the failure by arbitrators
to postpone a hearing where sufficient cause is shown, their refusal
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or any
other misbehavior which prejudices the rights of a party. 56 It is
obviously misconduct where a non-lawyer chairman of an arbitra-
tion panel consults his personal attorney before preparing his writ-
ten award. 57
55. In re Sanko S.S. Co., 495 F.2d 1260, 1973 A.M.C. 2088 (2d Cir. 1973).
56. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1976).
57. Holliday v. Samuels, 278 A.D. 687, 103 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1951).
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Although technical rules of evidence, applicable in jury trials,
are not observed in arbitration proceedings, 5 it follows from the
"misconduct" examples in the statute that the failure by the arbitra-
tors to permit cross-examination at all, or to permit cross-examina-
tion to continue, should lead to a charge of misconduct since the
opportunity to cross-examine acts like an oath in guaranteeing the
truthfulness of testimony. Obviously, this can be abused by counsel.
However, there appears to be no alternative for arbitrators but to
sit in cheerful silence, exhibiting no signs of exasperation.5 9  It is an
open question whether counsel conducting an unsuccessful cross-
examination in a lost cause could refrain from saying: "Let the
record reflect that Arbitrators A and B were reading the stock
quotations in the Wall Street Journal during cross-examination." Of
course the most effective cross-examination comes from the diffi-
culty the witness has in giving a truthful, coherent answer and not
the vehemence or sarcasm of counsel which will probably not im-
press "commercial men" anyway.
By statute, failure of the arbitrators to postpone a hearing on
request is misconduct, 0 but it does not follow that the arbitration
cannot proceed where one of the parties is so discourteous as not to
show up at a scheduled hearing. In such case the arbitrators can
proceed without the missing party and even proceed to an award.,'
While orderly procedures should be used, the purpose of the
fact finding is to arrive at the truth. Thus, arbitrators should be
58. Cf. In re Chevron Transp. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (where the
failure of the arbitrators to insure that the ship's logs were fully and timely available to the
other side was cited as misbehavior causing prejudice to the opposing party but rejected by
the court as insubstantial).
59. See Dan River, Inc. v. Cal-Togs Inc., 451 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (a non-
maritime case showing an abuse of the postponement privilege by a party which did not
result in vacation of the award). The chief witness for the day in question was an employee of
the party whose appearance had been scheduled months before the witness made a conflict-
ing engagement for the time of his scheduled appearance. The failure of the arbitrators to
adjourn did not result in vacation of the award.
60. It is also misbehavior for the arbitrators to fail to notify all parties of the time and
place of hearing. Petrol Corp. v. Groupement d'Achat des Carburants, 84 F. Supp. 446, 1949
A.M.C. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
61. In re Petroleum Transp., Ltd., 419 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re N.V.
"Nederland," 1945 A.M.C. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (order of Bright, J.) (The Silvaplana); cf.
Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. v. M/T Akti, 438 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (demands
for additional cross-examination of a witness who had been directly examined at a previous
hearing where the opposing party was absent before becoming ill; the demands were seen as
unreasonable after examination on written interrogatories and four hearings examining the
demanded witness' subordinate and no showing of the points to be elicited had been made).
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prepared to take testimony out of order if it will assist in developing
all the facts. 2 The normal order of procedure might be as follows:
1. Introduction and presentation of claimant's case in chief-
both factual and expert witnesses should be preceeded by a
presentation of all relevant documents.
2. Introduction and presentation of respondent's case in chief-
both factual and expert witnesses challenging the claimant's
facts.
3. Rebuttal by the claimant-the call or recall of witnesses
whose assertions will directly counter those of the respon-
dent.
4. Rebuttal by the respondent of claimant's rebuttal.
5. Optional summary of arguments by opposing counsel, usu-
ally followed by the exchange of written briefs.
While flexibility can be permitted on the question of an arbi-
trator's absence during the taking of testimony on condition that he
reads it, it is certain that testimony cannot be received from one
party in the absence of the opposing party.6 3
Lastly, neither statute nor decision requires that an arbitration
proceed under fixed rules, and it is the opinion of many experienced
admiralty counsel that fixed rules such as the A.A.A. or S.M.A.
Rules are not necessary in the hands of experienced arbitrators who
can make up the procedures as they go along in order to accommo-
date the problems of each case as they occur. Novel procedures,
radically different from those customarily used in arbitral or judi-
cial proceedings, should not be required without the consent of all
parties because of a possible argument of prejudice by a party. Due
process is usually an old and familiar process.
62. Steamship Alexandra, 1966 A.M.C. 2246, 2252 (1966) (Ferris, Besman & Bush,
Arbs.).
63. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing Co., 607 F.2d 649, 1980
A.M.C. 1961 (5th Cir. 1979). In this case an arbitration award was vacated on the grounds of
misbehavior of the arbitrators in consulting owner's counsel to determine the amount of
possible charter hire as damages without advising charterer's counsel and on the grounds of
exceeding their powers by awarding damages on an issue not submitted to them. The Fifth
Circuit found that the arbitrators had erred in excess of their powers by proceeding to base
their decision on damages for charter hire, something not claimed by the owner. To obtain
information of the vessel's earnings upon which to base charter hire damages the arbitrators
consulted owner's counsel by telephone after the hearings had ended and without informing
opposing counsel.
REVIEW OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
The question of arbitrator behavior in the questioning of wit-
nesses should be tested by the statutory language, "evident partial-
ity." Thus, while arbitrators "may" question witnesses to develop
uncertainties in the witness testimony, this right should rarely be
exercised and then only with extreme caution. 64
All the previous discussions presuppose a written record-ei-
ther a verbatim transcript or summaries of testimony. The latter
form of record may have been satisfactory in the formative years of
arbitration, but it is likely that despite a lack of requirements, no
arbitration would be held in New York today without a verbatim
transcript.
IV. FORM OF THE AWARD-WITH OR
WITHOUT REASONS
The United States Supreme Court has sustained an arbitration
award without reasons6 5 and this merely sanctions longstanding
practice. While the reasoned award may be the norm in European
arbitration systems, our tradition has required quick and relatively
informal procedures. It has also long been recognized that to re-
quire concurring arbitrators to force themselves to use the exact
same words in expressing their reasons might delay the arbitration
procedure considerably. Another explanation, usually unexpressed,
for not requiring reasoned awards is the desire of businessmen not
to give the lawyers something on which to base vacation of the
award. .6
The tradition of the award without reasons is so well estab-
lished that awards with reasons were once suspect even to the
courts,6 7 but the courts soon developed ways to insulate the award
from the reasons behind it. Thus, we see the idea that the arbitra-
tors' stated opinion can be treated as surplusage so long as the
64. See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. American Mineral Spirits Co., 22 F. Supp. 373, 1937
A.M.C. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). After the award the third arbitrator was challenged on
"evident partiality" because of excessively hostile questioning of a party's expert witnesses on
125 pages of a 731 page transcript. The court denied the challenge on the ground that the
arbitrator was himself an expert questioning "in his element." Id. at 376.
65. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 244 n.4 (1962).
66. But see In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972) (a nonmaritime case where the
court of appeals said that it was safer for arbitrators not to give their reasons).
67. In re States Marine Corp., 127 F. Supp. 943, 1954 A.M.C. 2110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
In this case the court felt it necessary to note that the fact that the arbitrators stated reasons
for the award did not mean that they had exceeded their powers in so doing.
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award was directly responsive to the issues. 8 The practical result
of this view is that the clear meaning of the award cannot be
controverted by imprecise reasoning since the arbitrators are free to
make erroneous statements of the law.
With the establishment of S.M.A.'s published award service
and the occasional excerpts of awards in American Maritime Cases,
Lloyd's Maritime Law Newsletter and other publications, it can be
expected that reasoned awards will become the norm rather than
the exception in future maritime arbitrations. It is highly desirable
for a legal system, presumably based on logic, to have available the
reasoning of the most qualified members of an industry in the
resolution of industry problems.
V. LACK OF UNANIMITY
The use of panels of three rather than two arbitrators seems to
presuppose the possibility of disagreement and has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of The Edward A.
Ryan,69 wherein the Court held that it was proper for the award to
be made and confirmed where four of five arbitrators had con-
curred.70
The courts have taken this one step further to permit a major-
ity-based award to be made without the signature of one party
arbitrator to the award. 71 In the Stej case, the impartiality of the
three arbitrators was questioned by counsel during the hearing
whereupon one arbitrator immediately resigned. It was held that it
did not exceed the powers of the two remaining arbitrators to
render an award in the absence of the third.
VI. REVIEW OF THE AWARD FOR ERRORS
Lawyers and laymen both are familiar with the legal maxim
De Minimis non Curat Lex-"The law does not notice trifles," but
every attorney proposing an arbitration clause to be included in a
contract for his client (and every client) should be aware of the
68. Universal Shipping Corp. v. Ionian S.S. Co., 1967 A.M.C. 2759 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See also Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32, 1980 A.M.C.
2451 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (where the court said that ambiguity or error in the opinion cannot
upset the award because arbitrators are not obliged to give opinions).
69. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
70. Id. at 276.
71. In re Stef Shipping Corp., 209 F. Supp. 249, 1963 A.M.C. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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arbitration maxim, De Maximis non Curat Lex-"You can't com-
plain after a stupid award." The rationale is that the risks to which
the parties have consented are erroneous fact finding72 and legally
incorrect decision. 73  Arbitration in the United States does not
"warrant" correct decisions. (Of course, nowhere in the United
States Constitution nor in state constitutions is there a provision
which states that a citizen has a right to have the law decided
correctly in the courts.)
Illustrative of this general proposition are the broad statements
by two important maritime courts, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits. The Ninth Circuit has
said: "A mere error in the law or failure on the part of arbitrators to
understand or apply the law, is not sufficient ground to set aside an
award of arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act." ' 74
To the same intent the Second Circuit has said: "On review,
the court may not rejudge the decision of the arbitrators on the
merits. The decision may be upset only for fraud, corruption,
partiality, ultra vires action or perverse misconstruction of the
law."
75
The broad language will be applied necessarily hundreds of
times as awards are brought forward for confirmation in the district
courts by the victorious parties where, on motion to confirm, the
court's powers are narrowly circumscribed, the court's function
being merely to determine whether the arbitrators' award falls
within the four corners of the dispute submitted. Thereafter, the
award will not be overturned because it is based on a misinterpreta-
tion of law or insufficient supporting facts .76
72. See In re South E. Ad. Shipping, Ltd., 356 F.2d 189, 1966 A.M.C. 434 (2d Cir.
1966); In re Harbor Island Spa Inc., 314 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
73. See Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp. of Pan., 312
F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); Amicizia Soeieta Navegazione v.
Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 1960 A.M.C. 2070 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
74. San Martine Compania de Navegacion S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d
796, 1962 A.M.C. 333 (9th Cir. 1961).
75. Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d
805, 1960 A.M.C. 2070 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). See also Saxis S.S. Co. v.
Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967).
76. See Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp. of Pan., 206
F. Supp. 777, 1964 A.M.C. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 949 (1963).
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A. Finality of Award
The statutory requirement that the award be "final and defi-
nite" 77 did not foresee the division of proceedings into a decision on
liability to be followed by an award of damages. This division has
proven its usefulness in judicial proceedings and arbitrations where
it permits the parties to arrive at a negotiated settlement after the
principal legal issue of liability has been determined. Neverthless, it
is not now possible to use the enforcement powers of the federal
courts where an interim award dealt only with the legal issue of the
existence of an agency relationship and did not go further to the
resulting determination of amounts due. 78  It is only when there
has been a complete determination of all the claims submitted to
the arbitrators that it will be possible to obtain enforcement. 79
B. Miscalculation
Where on the face of it the arbitrators have clearly and unin-
tentionally miscalculated the amount of the award, the completed
although erroneous award does not deprive the arbitrators of their
powers to correct mistakes in calculation and the courts are free to
resubmit the award to the same arbitrators for a correct calcula-
tion. This distinction of miscalculation, which is correctable, from
an error of fact or law, which is not correctable, was made in a
lengthy New York State maritime arbitration, involving lost molas-
ses, where the court said that an award could be set aside for
palpable errors in the nature of a miscalculation of figures or the
use of a false measure or weight which appears on the face of the
award.80 In the federal courts the resubmission of a miscalculated
award is authorized in section 11 of the statute. Despite this autho-
77. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1976). This section empowers the appropriate district court to
vacate arbitration awards "where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made." (emphasis added).
78. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Star Lines Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
79. In re Michaels, 624 F.2d 411, 1980 A.M.C. 1901 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Amoco
Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32, 1980 A.M.C. 245 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The "bifurcated hearing " has been approved as not, being an imperfect execution of
arbitrators' powers. Panemena Maritima v. J.E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.
1957); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536 (3d Cir. 1974).
80. In re First Nat'l Oil Corp., 2 Misc.2d 225, 151 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct.), aJJ'd, 2
A.D.2d 590, 157 N.Y.S.2d 313, appeal denied, 3 A.D.2d 672, 159 N.Y.S.2d 673, appeal
dismissed, 2 N.Y.2d 992, 143 N.E.2d 342, 163 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1956).
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rization, the provision is permissive, not mandatory, so that the
judge has discretion whether to require resubmission of the award if
such correction would be inordinately expensive. 81
C. Manifest Disregard of the Law and Exceeding Powers
Much has been written on this subject lately and I shall not
review it all .82 For counsel or client disappointed in the results of
an arbitration award, the doctrine has not provided the opportu-
nity to obtain easy reversals, as was once thought. It originated in
Wilko v. Swan, where the Supreme Court indicated, in dictum,
that in addition to the statutory grounds for vacating, an arbitra-
tion might be vacated where there was a "manifest disregard" of
the law. 83  This cryptic expression has not been fully tested even
now. Manifest disregard of the law has been held to not include the
failure to use a previous arbitral award as precedent, 84 the failure to
correctly follow legal decisions,8 5 the misinterpretation of a con-
tract,86 or the failure of arbitrators to rule on one of a parties' legal
arguments. 87  No case has yet overturned an arbitral award for
manifest disregard. 88 Speculation is that it will not apply until
arbitrators correctly state the law clearly applicable to the problem
and then just as clearly indicate a deliberate refusal to follow it for
no rational or justifiable reason. 89 The "frivolous" use of this argu-
ment has resulted in a penalty from the Second Circuit.90
81. In re Sociedad Armadora Aristomenis Pan. S.A., 184 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
See also In re South E. At. Shipping Ltd., 356 F.2d 189, 1966 A.M.C. 434 (2d Cir. 1966).
82. See Bauer, Manifest Disregard of the Law, 2 LMCLQ 142 (1972).
83. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Justice Reed comments, "In unrestricted submissions, such as
the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for
error in interpretation." Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
84. In re Western Sea Transp. Ltd., 1978 A.M.C. 1358 (S.D.N.Y.).
85. Anthony Shipping Co. v. Hugo Neu Corp., 482 F. Supp. 965, 1980 A.M.C. 1477
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
86. Reynolds Sees. Inc. v. Macquown, 459 F. Supp. 943 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
87. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32, 1980 A.M.C.
2451 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Parcel Tankers Co. v. Sidomar S.A., 1981 A.M.C. 39
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
88. See In re I/S Stavborg, 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 1974) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
89. See In re I/S Stavborg, 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974); Republic of Korea v. N.Y.
Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1972); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, 375
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967); San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals, 293
F.2d 796, 1962 A.M.C. 333 (9th Cir. 1961); Fukaya Trading Corp. S.A. v. Eastern Marine
Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278, 1971 A.M.C. 905 (E.D. La. 1971).
90. In re South E. Atl. Shipping Co., 356 F.2d 189, 1966 A.M.C. 434 (2d Cir. 1966).
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The language justifying vacation of an award where "the arbi-
trators exceeded their powers"91 has also not yet been excessively
tested. A recent case has said that the phrase must be given the
narrowest possible reading.9 2
CONCLUSION
"Overly technical judicial review of arbitration awards would
frustrate the basic purposes of arbitration: to resolve disputes speed-
ily and to avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceed-
ings."9 3
Many people recognize that accomplisment of the dual pur-
pose of arbitration is now only wishful thinking. As society becomes
inundated with laws, the obvious consequence is for lawyers to
penetrate into all areas of conflict with new rules requiring more
lawyers. This is what is happening in the arbitration process. The
basic thrust of this paper has been to restate the general principle
that since the parties have chosen to arbitrate their dispute rather
than engage in judicial proceedings, the courts will not be overly
technical as to such essentials as understanding the facts, interpret-
ing the law, or analyzing the evidence. Nevertheless, courts are
requiring, to an increasing degree, not only that the entire arbitra-
tion be fair but appear to be fair.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1976).
92. Mobil Oil Indonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing Co., 607
F.2d 649, 1980 A.M.C. 1961 (5th Cir. 1979); Molino v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 1979 A.M.C.
1878 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); States Marine Corp. v. Power S.S. Co., 127 F. Supp. 943, 1954
A.M.C. 2119 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
93. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd., 457 F.2d 387,
389 (2d Cir. 1972).
